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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 414(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, which was added by
ERISA, provides in part:
For purposes of sections 401, 410, 411, and 415, all employees of all
corporations which are members of a controlled group of corpora-
tions (within the meaning of section 1563(a), determined without re-
gard to section 1563(a)(4) and (e)(3)(C)) shall be treated as employed
by a single employer.'
No other provision of ERISA has imposed a more fundamental change
upon the legal framework governing the maintenance of qualified
plans2 in the private sector.3 Yet the fourth anniversary of ERISA has
passed without a significant effort by the Internal Revenue Service to
address effectively many of the policy choices presented by section
414(b).
The principal purpose for enacting section 414(b) was to expand
the application of the qualified plan coverage and nondiscrimination
standards of the Code from single corporate entities4 to controlled
1. I.R.C. § 414(b). Section 414(b) was added to the Code by ERISA § 1015.
2. If a pension or profit sharing plan is "qualified" under I.R.C. § 401, then the plan is
exempt from taxation, I.R.C. § 501, and the employer's contributions to the plan are currently
deductible, subject to the rules of I.R.C. § 404(a).
3. Section 4(b)(1) of ERISA exempts governmental plans from the Act's coverage. Section
3(32) of ERISA defines a "governmental plan" as:
A plan established or maintained for its employees by the Government of the United
States .... The term "governmental plan" also includes any plan to which the Rail-
road Retirement Act of 1935 or 1937 applies, and which is financed by contributions
required under that Act and any plan of an international organization which is exempt
from taxation under the provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act
(59 Stat. 669).
4. Prior to enactment of ERISA, the requirements for qualification were applicable sepa-
rately to each corporate entity that adopted a qualified plan without regard to its status as a
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groups5 of corporations.6 At this writing, however, it is impossible, ex-
cept in extreme situations, to advise a controlled group of corporations
on the exact impact of section 414(b) upon coverage within the group.
In practical terms, most qualified pension and profit sharing plans that
were maintained by members of controlled groups, and were in exist-
ence at the time ERISA was enacted have been amended to comply
with ERISA and approved by the Service without serious scrutiny of
the coverage of the group. In addition, section 414(b) is widely viewed
as overruling regulations and rulings of the Service that required each
corporate entity to satisfy independently the requirements of the Code
and that placed constraints upon the ability of affiliated corporate enti-
ties to adopt a single qualified plan for their employees.7 Yet, the ex-
tent to which these rules of prior law may have continuing effect after
ERISA remains unclear.
To date, the published regulations under section 414(b) have dealt
principally with the definition of a controlled group.' In addition, the
rules for the crediting of service in the controlled group context have
been set forth in substantial detail in regulations issued by the Depart-
ment of Labor.9 The published rulings and regulations, however, deal
only incidentally with the basic questions of coverage and discrimina-
tion in the controlled group. 10 Thus, the precise impact of section
member of a controlled group. See Rev. Rul. 69-260, 1969-1 C.B. 116, and the text accompanying
notes 21-32 infra. Consequently, one member of a controlled group could adopt a qualified plan
for its employees even if other members of the group did not maintain a plan.
5. For a discussion of the definition of a controlled group of corporations, see text accompa-
nying notes 11-20 infra.
6. Congress was also concerned with the use of sole proprietorships, partnerships and other
non-corporate ownership forms to circumvent the coverage and antidiscrimination standards of
the Code. Accordingly, section 414(c) was adopted, imposing upon commonly controlled "trades
or businesses" rules similar to those established under section 414(b) for controlled groups of
corporations.
7. See, e.g., Scharf, Establishing Multiple Employer Plans May Be Solution to Section 414
Problems of Controlled Employers, 3 J. PENSION PLAN & COMPLIANCE 279 (1977).
8. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1A14(b)-I, 5 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 1 20138 (proposed
Nov. 5, 1975). See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.414(c)-i to -5 (1965); 1.414(f)-i (1978).
9. In general, these rules provide that all service with any member of the controlled group
must be credited for purposes of eligibility and vesting. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2530.210(a), (d) (1978). For
purposes of benefit accrual, only years of plan participation must be credited. 29 C.F.R.
§ 2530.210(a)(2) (1978). Seegenerally Schollander, Control Group Service Computations, 3 J. PEN-
SION PLAN & COMPLIANCE 271 (1977).
10. The principal regulation published to date dealing with the application of the coverage
standards of the Code to controlled groups is Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-i(d)(8) (1977), which provides
in its entirety:
(8) Certain controlled groups. In applying the percentage test and classification test
described in paragraph (b)(1) and (2) of this section for a year, all the employees of
corporations or trades and businesses whose employees are treated as employed by a
single employer by reason of section 414(b) or (c) must be taken into account. The pre-
ceding sentence shall apply for a plan year if, on 1 day in each quarter of such plan year,
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414(b) upon qualified plans for controlled groups of corporations is un-
known. This Article will briefly explain the definition of a controlled
group of corporations, describe the legal status of controlled employer
plans prior to ERISA, discuss the reasons why section 414(b) was en-
acted, discuss coverage and discrimination in controlled group plans,
pinpoint the problems caused by section 414(b) and the choice between
a single plan and separate plans for members of a controlled group,
and finally, discuss several possible solutions to these problems.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF A CONTROLLED GROUP OF CORPORATIONS
This Article will not undertake a detailed discussion of the defini-
tion of a controlled group of corporations--a topic that has recently
been the subject of a lively debate in judicial forums' '-yet some un-
derstanding of the characteristics of a controlled group is essential to
the following discussion. The concept of a "controlled group of corpo-
rations" originated in the Revenue Act of 196412 as a mechanism for
limiting the ability of related economic interests to utilize multiple-cor-
porate entities for artificial tax advantage.' 3 The principal concern was
the circumvention of the corporate tax surcharge rates by the use of
multiple corporations.' 4 Section 1563(a)' 5 defines a controlled group of
corporations as two or more corporations that are component members
of a "parent-subsidiary" controlled group, a "brother-sister" controlled
group or a "combined" controlled group. 16 Generally, a parent-subsid-
iary controlled group consists of one or more chains of corporations
connected through eighty percent stock ownership with a common par-
ent corporation.'7 A brother-sister controlled group, on the other hand,
consists of two or more corporations that are owned by common groups
of five or fewer persons in certain prescribed percentages.' 8 A com-
such corporations are members of a controlled group of corporations (within the mean-
ing of section 414(b)) of such trades or businesses are under common control (within the
meaning of section 414(c)).
11. See Fairfax Auto Parts v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.), rev'g 68 T.C. 620
(1977). See also Charles Baloian Co., 68 T.C. 620 (1977); T.L. Hunt, Inc., 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 966
(1976), rey'd, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977).
12. Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235, 78 Stat. 19 (adding I.R.C. § 1563 for taxable years ending after
1963).
13. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
14. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
15. I.R.C. § 1563(a).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 1563(a)(1).
18. Id. § 1563(a)(2). In general, two or more corporations will constitute a brother-sister
controlled group where both of the following tests are met: (1) five or fewer persons own at least
eighty percent of the total combined voting power or at least eighty percent of the value of all
classes of stock of each corporation; and (2) the same five or fewer persons own more than fifty
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bined controlled group, as its name implies, consists of three or more
corporations comprised of a combination of brother-sister and parent-
subsidiary groups. 19
Thus, a controlled group's composition and degree of affiliation
can vary markedly. For example, the controlled group definition could
encompass a publicly traded New York Stock Exchange company
whose business might be conducted through a wholly owned subsidiary
rather than through a division. On the other hand, the definition also
could cover two closely held brother-sister corporations whose sole re-
lationship was fifty-one percent common ownership by a group of com-
mon stockholders, even when the common stockholders are wholly
divorced from active management of both companies.2 0
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING PLANS OF CONTROLLED
EMPLOYERS PRIOR TO ERISA
A. Pre-ERISA Law.
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, two or more corporations-
whether or not they were affiliated-could jointly sponsor a qualified
employee benefit plan. The principal benefit of joint sponsorship was
enhanced investment capacity through the commingling of the respec-
tive contributions. However, numerous rules ignoring the unity of a
joint plan limited the attractiveness of such plans. For instance, each
employer had to meet the qualification requirements independently.21
Thus, if a parent and a subsidiary corporation (or a brother and a sis-
ter) corporation jointly adopted a pension plan for their respective em-
ployees, the IRS would require each corporation to satisfy
independently the coverage and the nondiscrimination requirements
with respect to its own employees,2 to determine separately the cost for
percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than fifty
percent of the total value of all classes of stock of each corporation, taking into account only the
smallest percentage of stock ownership of each person in any of the corporations. See Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.1563-1 to -4 (1965); Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 11.414(c)-i to -4 (1975). See generally Bluestein &
Van de Ven, Handling Qual/fed Plansrfor Related Groups in View of Recent Court Decisions, 46 J.
TAx. 350 (1977).
19. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(3).
20. Apart from Subchapter D of the Code, a parent-subsidiary controlled group may be sub-
ject to federal income tax rules that are significantly different from those applied to a brother-
sister controlled group. The parent-subsidiary group is normally eligible to elect to file a consoli-
dated federal income tax return while the brother-sister controlled group is not eligible to file a
consolidated tax return. I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504.
21. Rev. Rul. 69-250, 1969-1 C.B. 116; Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(d) (1960).
22. The best statement of the Service's view of such joint plans was that of Isidore Goodman
the longtime Chief of the IRS Pension Trust Branch, who said-
A single plan and trust may be used by a group of employers, regardless of their
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its own employees2 3 and to make separate contributions to fund the
plan.24 Moreover, the Service required maintenance of separate
records to reflect each contributing corporation's pro rata share of the
trust fund and prohibited the use of one corporation's allocable portion
of the assets to satisfy another corporation's plan liabilities.25 From a
legal viewpoint the "joint" adoption of a single plan by several affili-
ated corporate entities was somewhat illusory. It was more accurate to
state that each employer adopted its own separate plan, but shared plan
documents with the other adopting employers.
This emphasis on the separate status of each corporate entity's
plan created technical barriers to the establishment of joint, qualified
plans by members of controlled groups of corporations. For example,
in Revenue Ruling 69-525,26 the Service ruled that the actuarial cost of
a qualified pension plan adopted by two affiliated employers could not
be determined on an aggregate basis and apportioned between the
adopting employers. Instead, cost had to be determined separately for
each adopting employer unless the adopting employers were unable to
determine cost separately. The ruling nullified economies of scale po-
degree of affiliation, but each employer separately must satisfy the requirements for
qualification and deductions. In other words, it is necessary to establish that the applica-
le requirements are met by each employer as if he adopted and maintained the plan
exclusively.
Isidore Goodman on Qua/fled Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans Under the Internal Revenue Code-
Speeches delivered between October 20, 1955 andNovember 21, 1966, PENS. PROFIT SHARING REP.
19,012.1 (Nov. 9, 1960).
23. Rev. Rul. 69-525, 1969-2 C.B. 102. See also Rev. Rul. 70-532, 1970-2 C.B. 95.
24. Rev. Rul. 71-96, 1971-1 C.B. 132. In that ruling, a parent corporation was not permitted
to deduct a contribution made on behalf of its subsidiary. For a limited exception to this rule, see
note 28 infra.
25. The use of plan assets of one controlled employer to satisfy the plan liabilities of another
affiliated employer violates the exclusive benefit rationale of Revenue Ruling 69-570, 1969-2 C.B.
91. See note 29 infra and accompanying text. Prior to ERISA many IRS examiners at the district
level required an express statement that plan assets would not be so used in the case of commin-
gled investment trusts maintained in conjunction with multiple plans for affiliated employers. See
also Rev. Rul. 73-534, 1973-2 C.B. 132; Rev. Rul. 69-502, 1969-2 C.B. 89.
26. 1969-2 C.B. 102. The ruling illustrates three pre-ERISA situations involving defined ben-
efit pension plans of multiple employers. In the first situation, the general rule is established that
where "[elach corporation is able to determine the separate cost" of its plan, a separate cost
determination must be made for each plan. Id. at 103. In the second situation, it is noted that
"[s]ince employees are continually shifted between the two corporations [which sponsor the plan],
it is not feasible to determine by separate computations the costs properly attributable to each
corporation." Id. Accordingly, in the second situation the ruling sanctions determination of actu-
arial cost on an aggregate basis and apportionment of cost between the two corporations on the
basis of the relative size of the participating payrolls.
The ruling has had significant nuisance value in the case of plans maintained by a large
number of affiliated employers. Normally the most efficient method for the plan actuary is to
aggregate the data for all plans participants, make a single cost computation, and then apportion
cost among all participating employers. The ruling implies that such a method is not permitted
unless it is impossible to make a separate cost computation for each participating employer.
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tentially available in cost determinations for controlled groups and re-
sulted in erratic cost allocations for small employers within the group.27
Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 69-35,2s the Service ruled that in the case
of a profit sharing plan maintained jointly by a parent corporation and
its wholly owned subsidiary, amounts contributed by one corporation
would not be deductible by that corporation insofar as they were allo-
cated to the accounts of participants employed by the other corpora-
tion.
The most extreme example of the technical barriers is Revenue
Ruling 69-570,29 which dealt with a profit sharing plan adopted by a
parent corporation and its four subsidiaries. The plan failed to qualify
because it provided that a forfeiture occurring by reason of an em-
ployee's termination of employment would be reallocated among par-
27. A general discussion of the methods of computation of actuarial cost for a defined benefit
pension plan is beyond the scope of this Article. The actuarial liability of any plan is a function,
inter alia, of the benefits provided, the age and compensation levels of employees, and the actua-
rial assumptions with respect to interest rates, mortality, and turnover. In addition, plan "costs"
may vary widely depending upon the actuarial "method" used to combine these factors. Where
several corporate entities sponsor one plan, the most efficient manner of determining cost, regard-
less of the actuarial method being used, will be to aggregate all employee data and determine a
single cost for the entire pool of employees. The cost so determined is then apportioned among
the participating entities by various methods. For example, cost might be apportioned in propor-
tion to the participating payrolls. Where the Service insists that a separate cost computation be
made for each entity based on the employee data of that entity, the work of the actuary is multi-
plied. In addition, the pooling of data for a single cost computation may also serve an averaging
function. For example, if a small entity has a disproportionate number of older employees, the
separate computation of that entity's cost might produce a higher liability than would have been
the case if cost had been computed on an aggregate basis for all entities and prorated among them.
28. 1969-1 C.B. 117. The general rule announced in Revenue Ruling 69-35 is, of course,
subject to an express statutory exception recognized in the ruling. Section 404(a)(3)(B) permits a
deduction for special "make-up contributions" in certain circumstances. In general, section
404(a)(3)(B) is applicable where one member of an affiliated group within the meaning of section
1504 (as contrasted to a controlled group within the meaning of section 1563(a)) is prevented from
making a contribution to its profit sharing plan because it has no current or accumulated earnings
or profits. In such a situation, the other members of the affiliated group may make a contribution
on behalf of the financially disabled corporation's plan and deduct it.
The scope of section 404(a)(3)(B) is extremely limited, since it is only applicable where there
is a complete absence of current or accumulated earnings and profits as contrasted to a mere
financial inability on the part of the poor corporation to make a contribution to the plan. In
addition, it is the position of the Service that section 404(a)(3)(B) is applicable only where the
contribution of the poor corporation is required under a formula set forth in the plan. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.404(a)-10(a)(2) (1956). Thus, section 404(a)(3)(B) is applicable regardless of whether a
consolidated return election is actually made.
29. 1969-2 C.B. 91. In Revenue Ruling 71-148, 1971-1 C.B. 117, the Service retreated some-
what in a situation involving a profit sharing plan maintained by a corporation and ten subsidiar-
ies where "[d]ue to the varying manpower needs of the corporations, employees are moved about
from one corporation to another,. . . usually on a daily basis." Id. Since the origin of forfeited
amounts was "unascertainable," the ruling holds that Revenue Ruling 69-570, 1969-2 C.B. 91, was
not applicable and that forfeitures could be reallocated under any reasonable method.
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ticipants employed by all of the corporations in the controlled group,
rather than solely among the participants employed by the corporation
that employed the terminated employee. The stated rationale of Reve-
nue Ruling 69-570 was the Service's interpretation of the "exclusive
benefit" requirement of the Code. Section 401(a)(2), as in effect both
before and after enactment of ERISA, provides that a plan will not
qualify unless
under the trust instrument it is impossible, at any time prior to the
satisfaction of all liabilities with respect to employees, . . . for any
part of the corpus or income to be ... used for, or diverted to, pur-
poses other than for the exclusive benefit of [an employer's] employ-
ees or their beneficiaries.30
From this general admonition, apparently intended to prevent an em-
ployer from recapturing funds previously contributed to a plan, the
Service reached the somewhat surprising conclusion that a plan permit-
ting contributions by one employer to benefit employees of another af-
filiated employer violated the exclusive benefit requirement.
These three revenue rulings seem to be based on other unarticu-
lated reasons. Where the operation of a qualified plan permits the use
of one employer's contributions for the benefit of an affiliated corpora-
tion's employees, the Service might well be concerned not only with the
impact on the qualified plan, but also with the tax consequences of this
transfer of a benefit from one corporation to the other. If a parent-
subsidiary controlled group filed a consolidated return, the systematic
discharge by one corporation of the pension obligations of another
member would subvert the elaborate rules set forth in the consolidated
return regulation, which seek to properly apportion income and basis
within the consolidated group.31 Moreover, under traditional tax anal-
ysis, the systematic discharge by a brother corporation of the pension
obligations of a sister corporation might be viewed as a constructive
dividend to the common shareholder followed by a correlative contri-
bution to the capital of the sister corporation.32
B. Legislative History and Purpose of Section 414(b).
The Service's interpretation of the exclusive benefit rule restricted
the usefulness of joint plans for controlled groups of corporations. De-
spite the resulting technical difficulties, Congress did not design section
30. I.R.C. § 401(a)(2).
31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.502-11 (1973).
32. See, ag., David Aylsworth, 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 63,221 (1963); George W. Offutt III, 32
T.C.M. (P-H) 1 63,126 (1963), aft'd, 336 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1964); Forcum-James Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 7 T.C. 1155 (1946), appeal dismissed, 176 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1949); Rev. Rul. 69-630, 1969-2
C.B. 112.
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414(b) to alleviate them. Rather, Congress sought to deal with a more
fundamental problem. Some employers had adopted multiple-corpo-
rate forms in order to circumvent the coverage and the antidiscrimina-
tion requirements of section 401. For instance, a business unit could
split itself into two corporations; one employing highly compensated
persons, the other employing rank-and-file workers. The former would
adopt a pension plan, the latter would not. The result-that the busi-
ness' executives had a pension plan but that its workers did not-would
not prevent the plan from being qualified, despite the transparent sub-
version of the antidiscrimination provisions.33
Consequently, the House Committee reported out section 414(b),
stating the purpose as follows:
The committee, by this provision [Section 414(b)], intends to make it
clear that the coverage and antidiscrimination provisi6ns cannot be
avoided by operating through separate corporations instead of sepa-
rate branches of one corporation. For example, if managerial func-
tions were performed through one corporation employing highly
compensated personnel, which has a generous pension plan, and as-
sembly-line functions were performed through one or more other
corporations employing lower-paid employees, which have less gen-
erous plans or no plans at all, this would generally constitute an im-
permissible discrimination. By this provision the committee is
clarifying this matter for the future. It intends that prior law on this
point be determined as if this provision had not been enacted.
34
At the same time, the Committee stressed that the new section
would not require complete uniformity in the qualified plans through-
out the controlled group.
[The Committee provision is not intended to mean that all pension
plans of a controlled group of corporations * * * must be exactly
alike, or that a controlled group could not have pension plans for
some corporations but not for others. Thus, where the corporation in
question contains a fair cross-section of high- and low-paid employ-
ees (compared to the employees of the controlled group as a whole),
and where the plan coverage is nondiscriminatory with respect to the
employees of the corporation in question, it is anticipated that the
Internal Revenue Service would find that the plan met the antidis-
crimination tests, even though other corporations in the controlled
group had a less favorable retirement plan, or no plan at all. On the
other hand, if, looking at the controlled group as a whole, it were
found that a disproportionate number of highly compensated em-
ployees were covered under the plan of the corporation in question,
or that the average compensation of covered employees was substan-
tially higher in that plan than the average compensation of noncov-
33. The most flagrant example under prior law was Packard v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 621
(1975). But see Burnetta v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 387 (1977).
34. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1974).
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ered employees, it would be anticipated that the plan would not be
found to be qualified, because the corporation does not contain a fair
cross section of the controlled group of employees. 35
Section 414(b) can be seen as a logical application of the reasoning
that led to the creation of the concept of a "controlled group of corpo-
rations." The surcharge form of corporate taxation was designed to
limit the corporate tax liability of small businesses and thus to en-
courage them to adopt corporate form. Yet "medium and large enter
prises have in some cases taken advantage of the lower rates afforded
small business by organizing their corporate structure in multiple cor-
porate form."36 Similarly, section 414(a) was created to prevent busi-
ness organizations from masquerading as several in order to sidestep
nondiscrimination provisions otherwise applicable to them. Since, by
definition, the legal differences among members of a controlled group
are artificial ones, the employees of the several members are to be
treated as if they were the employees of one employer.
Thus, even though the legislative history of section 414(b) indi-
cates that Congress was not focusing on the elaborate rules constructed
by the IRS prior to the enactment of ERISA,37 the conceptual ap-
proach of those rules--emphasizing the separateness of the members of
the controlled group and requiring defacto independence of their re-
spective plans-is irreconcilable with both the language and the con-
ceptual approach of section 414(b). For instance, the "exclusive
benefit" rule of Revenue Ruling 69-57038 for qualification of plans sim-
ply cannot be squared with the literal terms of section 414(b): "all em-
ployees of all corporations which are members of a controlled group of
corporations. . . shall be treated as employed by a single employer." 39
35. Id. 50-51.
36. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1963), refprintedin 1964-1 (Part 2) C.B. 125,
240-41.
37. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
38. 1969-2 C.B. 91.
39. I.R.C. § 414(b) (emphasis added). Section 413(c) of the Code, also added by ERISA,
expressly provides that the narrow construction of the exclusive benefit requirement is overruled
with respect to "a plan maintained by more than one employer." I.R.C. § 413(c). Section
413(c)(2) provides:
(2) Exclusive benoft. For purposes of section 401(a) in determining whether the plan of
an employer is for the exclusive benefit of his employees and their beneficiaries all plan
participants shall be considered to be his employees.
The provisions of section 413(c) could be viewed as applying to a plan adopted by one or
more employers of a controlled group. If two or more corporations that are members of a con-
trolled group adopt the same plan, section 413(c) seems applicable by its literal terms. If section
413(c) is applicable to a plan adopted by two or more members of a controlled group, then section
413(c)(2) would have the effect of expressly overruling the Service's exclusive benefit rationale in
the context of the controlled group. Necessarily, Revenue Ruling 69-570 would have no continu-
ing validity after ERISA.
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And how can the rules requiring separate maintenance of plans be rec-
onciled with section 414(b) when the fullest effectuation of the underly-
ing policies of the section occurs only when every employee of every
corporation in the controlled group is covered by the same employee
benefit plan? The balance of this Article will consider the coverage
standards that have developed for the controlled group in light of the
basic policy of section 414(b) and the extent to which the controlled
group of employers is free from the constraints of prior law in estab-
lishing a single plan for employees.
IV. COVERAGE AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE CONTROLLED GRouP
A. Prerequisites to Qualjlcation.
"Qualification" of an employee benefit plan creates substantial tax
benefits that make qualified plans a desirable form of compensation.
To qualify, a plan must meet the "coverage" tests, which are designed
"to insure that stock bonus, pension or profit-sharing plans are oper-
ated for the welfare of employees in general, and to prevent the trust
device from being used for the benefit of shareholders, officials, or
highly paid employees. . . ." The Code provides several alternative
methods of meeting the coverage requirements.
1. The Percentage Coverage Test. Section 410(b)(1)(A) sets forth
However, the IRS has taken the position in proposed regulations adopted under section
413(c) that section 413(c) is not applicable to a plan sponsored by multiple employers if all of the
sponsors are members of the same controlled group. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.413-2, 43 Fed.
Reg. 38602, 38604 (1978). The proposed regulations define a multiple-employer plan as a "single
plan" maintained by "more than one employer." Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1A13-2(a)(2). However,
for purposes of this test "the number of employers maintaining the plan is determined by treating
any employers described in section 414(b) (relating to a controlled group of corporations) ... as
if such employers are a single employer." Id. Under this interpretation, section 413(c) would not
be applicable to a plan sponsored by a controlled group of employers unless there was also at least
one non-group member sponsoring the plan.
The position adopted in the proposed regulations is questionable as a matter of statutory
interpretation. Section 414(b) provides that "[flor purposes of sections 401, 410, 411 and 415, all
employees of all corporations which are members of a controlled group of corporations... shall
be treated as employed by a single employer." I.R.C. § 414(b). Thus, section 414(b) expressly
does not include any cross reference to section 413. On the other hand, section 413 is literally
applicable "[i]n the case of a plan maintained by more than one employer." LR.C. § 413(c). Ac-
cordingly, it would appear that unless section 414(b) is applicable for purposes of section 413,
which it is not, the Service's position cannot be sustained. Moreover, the provisions of section
414(b) and 413(c) are neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive.
The point may be moot since section 414(b) may be interpreted to impose each of the require-
ments of section 413(c) on plans maintained by controlled employers. However, the Service's
position with respect to 414(b) has not yet been fully developed.
40. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1942) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1942-
2 C.B. 372, 450.
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a mathematical test of adequate coverage. Satisfaction of this test re-
quires that a plan cover either at least seventy percent of all employees
or at least eighty percent of all eligible employees as long as seventy
percent or more of all employees are eligible.4 1 For the purposes of this
test, the employer may exclude employees who have not met the mini-
mum age and service requirements of the plan (which generally may
not be greater than the later of age twenty-five and one year of service),
nonresident aliens whose compensation is not from sources within the
United States, and employees who are members of a unit of employees
covered by a collective bargaining agreement if there is evidence that
retirement benefits were the subject of good faith bargaining between
the employer and the employee representatives. 42
Section 414(b) provides that all employees employed by every
member of the controlled group must be considered in determining
whether any single plan of any controlled group employer meets the
percentage test.43 For many controlled groups, satisfaction of the per-
centage test will be difficult. If the controlled group consists of several
employers of relatively equal size, each of which sponsors a separate
plan, no employer in the group will meet the percentage test even
though every employee of the group is covered by a comparable plan.
2. The Nondiscriminatory Classfcation Test. If a plan cannot
meet the percentage coverage test, there are two other methods of satis-
fying the coverage requirements. First, section 410(b)(1)(B) provides
that a plan not meeting the percentage requirement will nonetheless
qualify if the plan covers a "fair cross section" of the employees.44 A
fair cross section is defined to mean "a classification set up by the em-
ployer and found by the secretary not to be discriminatory in favor of
employees who are officers, shareholders, or highly compensated. ' 45
The question of whether a classification established by an em-
ployer discriminates in favor of officers, shareholders or highly com-
pensated employees is, of course, a question about which employers
and the Service might reasonably disagree. Most of the development of
the law concerning what constitutes a nondiscriminatory classification
or a "fair cross section"' occurred prior to enactment of ERISA. The
41. I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(A).
42. I.R.C. §§ 410(b)(l)(A), (2)(A), (2)(C).
43. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.410(b)-(l)(d)(8) (1977). For example, if the controlled group consists of
four corporations each having an identical number of employees and each maintaining a separate
plan for its respective employees, no individual plan will cover more than 25% of the employees of
the group. Accordingly, no individual plan will meet the 80% test.
44. I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B).
45. Id.
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context in which the question arose concerned whether plans within a
single corporation covering only salaried employees covered a fair
cross section of all employees.46 The principles that have developed in
this area will generally be applicable in determining whether a plan
covering the employees of one corporation covers a fair cross section of
the employees of the entire controlled group for purposes of section
414(b).47
In Revenue Ruling 70-200,41 the most significant Revenue Ruling
illustrating the concept of a "fair cross section," the Service held that a
profit sharing plan limited to full-time salaried employees covered a
fair cross section of all employees. The salaried and hourly employees
fell into the following compensation ranges:
Participants Who
Excluded Are Officers,
Compensation Total Hourly Salaried Shareholders
Range Employees Employees Participants or Supervisors
$25,000 to $30,000 4 0 4 4
$20,001 to $25,000 0 0 0 0
$15,001 to $20,000 25 18 7 7
$12,501 to $15,000 45 37 8 3
$10,001 to $12,500 50 38 12 3
$ 7,501 to $10,000 14 11 3 0
$ 5,001 to $ 7,500 9 4 5 0
$ 2,500 to $ 5,000 3 2 1 0
Total 150 110 40 22
In reviewing this coverage, the Service noted that twenty-two of
the forty plan participants were officers, shareholders or supervisors.
However, the compensation of all but four of the forty participants was
substantially the same as that of the excluded hourly employees. Fur-
thermore, the Service noted that the plan covered employees in all
compensation ranges and that the coverage of medium- and low-paid
employees was more than nominal. The Service concluded that the
plan covered a fair cross section and therefore ruled that the plan cov-
46. See Commissioner v. Pepsi-Cola Niagra Bottling Corp., 399 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1968),
revjg 48 T.C. 75 (1958); Ed & Jim Fleitz, Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 384 (1968); Ray Cleaners,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 23 (1968). See generally Goodman, When Will a Sala-
ried-Only Plan BeApprovedby the IRS, 9 TAx. FOR ACCOUNTANTS 170 (1972); Lurie, Coping with
IRS. Tough Tests for Salaried-Only Plans in the Post-Pepsi Period, 32 J. TAX. 24 (1970); Lurie,
Discrimination in Salaried-Only Plans.- Defning the Outer Limits, 31 J. TAX. 322 (1969).
47. ERISA did not alter the relevant statutory test. Compare present I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B)
with pre-ERISA I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)(B). Hence the revenue rulings and cases construing old I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(3)(B) cited in note 46 supra will have continuing vitality in construing the requirements
of new I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B).
48. 1970-1 C.B. 101.
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ered a nondiscriminatory classification.49
If the employer's plan fails to meet the percentage test or does not
cover a "fair cross section" of employees, the plan's coverage may
nonetheless satisfy the Code. The law has long permitted an employer
sponsoring two or more separate plans that cover different groups of his
employees to "designate" both plans as a single plan for purposes of
satisfaction of the coverage and antidiscrimination tests.5 0 However, in
order to designate the plans as a fictional single plan, the plans desig-
nated must be "comparable" in contributions or benefits.5' For two
plans to be comparable, "the benefits provided for an employer's low
paid employees, assuming a juxtaposition of two plans, must be at least
as good as the benefits provided for the employer's higher paid supervi-
sory employees. 52 The importance of the designation and comparabil-
ity concepts have been enhanced by the passage of ERISA and section
414(b), since they diminish the likelihood that the plans of a controlled
group will meet the percentage test.
The percentage test of coverage is a safe harbor rule. The fair
cross section and the designation tests, on the other hand, are obscure
and subjective. These tests can never be defined with complete preci-
sion due to their reliance on a factual determination of whether a fair
cross section or comparability exists. This uncertainty is difficult to live
with for any employer with an employee benefit plan. The uncertainty
is more acute if the employer is a member of a controlled group of
employers.
B. Unresolved Issues in the Coverage of Controlled Groups Plans.
1. Use of Section 414(b) to Qualiyj a Plan Not Qualfying Under
Prior Law. One area of uncertainty is whether section 414(b) will oper-
ate to permit qualification of an employee benefit plan by reference to
the employees of all the members of a controlled group when the plan
would fail to qualify by reference only to the employees of the sponsor.
49. Id.
50. I.R.C. § 410(b)(1).
An employer may designate two or more plans as constituting a single plan which is
intended to qualify for purposes of Section 410(b)(1) and this section, in which case all
plans so designated shall be considered as a single plan in determining whether the re-
quirements of such section are satisfied by each of the separate plans. A determination
hat the combinations of plans so designated does not satisfy such requirements does not
preclude a determination that one or more of such plans, considered separately, satisfies
such requirements.
Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-l(d)(3)(i) (1977).
51. Rev. Rul. 70-580, 1970-2 C.B. 91; Rev. RuL 70-183, 1970-1 C.B. 104; Rev. Rul. 66-15,
1966-1 C.B. 83. See generally Metzer, Comparability Under Section 401(a): OfTheoreticalorPrac-
tical Value?, 50 TAXEs 459 (1972).
52. Metzer, supra note 51, at 460.
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The language of the Code justifies the conclusion that such qualifica-
tion is permissible under ERISA, but the Service has yet to rule on the
issue. This qualification approach can be illustrated by the following
example, which is based on the facts of Revenue Ruling 70-200.
53
Table A
I
Corp. A II I
Compensation (Salaried Corp. A Corp. B
Range Employees) (Hourly Employees) (All Employees)
$25,000 to $30,000 4 0 0
$20,001 to $25,000 0 0 0
$15,001 to $20,000 0 18 7
$12,501 to $15,000 0 37 8
$10,001 to $12,500 0 38 12
$ 7,501 to $10,000 0 11 3
$ 5,001 to $ 7,500 0 4 5
$ 2,500 to $ 5,000 0 2 1
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, if corporation A adopted a "sal-
aried only" plan, the plan would fail to satisfy the coverage require-
ments because, considering only corporation A, the plan would cover
four highly compensated salaried employees but would not cover any
of the lower-paid hourly employees. Under section 414(b), however, if
corporation B maintains a "comparable" plan55 to the salaried-only
plan of corporation A, then corporation A, in attempting to demon-
strate the qualification of its plan, could "designate" its salaried-only
plan plus the plan of corporation B as a fictional single plan for pur-
poses of meeting the coverage requirements.5 6 If such a designation
were made, the fictional single plan would present the exact facts of
Revenue Ruling 70-200.57 Since the Service held in that revenue ruling
that the plan covered a fair cross section of the single sponsor's employ-
ees and since section 414(b) provides that all the employees within a
controlled group shall be treated as employed by a single employer,
corporation A's plan, considered in conjunction with corporation B's
plan, should be considered a nondiscriminatory classification within
the meaning of section 410(b)(1)(B).
53. 1970-1 C.B. 101. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
54. Table A represents the employee coverage of three pension plans adopted by a controlled
group of corporations. Column I of the table lists the salaried employees of corporation A by
annual compensation. Column II sets forth in like manner the hourly employees of corporation
A, and Column III tabulates all employees, salaried and hourly, of corporation B.
55. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
56. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-l(d)(3)(i) (1977).
57. 1970-1 C.B. 101. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
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Nonetheless, some IRS examiners have been unwilling to approve
a salaried-only plan or other plan that would not have qualified under
prior law. This reluctance appears to find some support in a reference
in the committee reports to "plan coverage [that] is non-discriminatory
with respect to the employees of the corporation in question. ' 58 How-
ever, this reference is inapposite59 and the law seems quite clear on this
point. The Service should therefore consider adding an affirmative
statement in the regulations under section 414(b) clarifying the ability
to qualify in this manner.
2. Designation of Multole Plans in a Controlled Group. Another
area of uncertainty is the extent to which the flexibility of "picking and
choosing" within the controlled group will permit the continued quali-
fication of plans primarily covering highly compensated individuals
notwithstanding the policies underlying section 414(b). Consider, for
example, the controlled group of corporations reflected in Table B con-
sisting of Rich Corporation A (column I), Rich Corporation B (column
II), Cross Section Corporation (column III) and Poor Corporation (col-
umn IV) and employing persons falling into the following compensa-
tion ranges:
58. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 34. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
59. The phrase is inapposite to the situation in Table A because it is part of a sentence that
illustrates the propositions that all qualified plans of a controlled group need not be exactly alike
and that some members of a controlled group may have plans while others do not. The full
sentence states:
Thus, where the corporation in question contains a fair cross section of high and low
paid employees (compared to the employees of the controlled group as a whole), and
where the plan coverage is non-discriminatory with respect to the employees of the cor-
poration in question, it is anticipated that the Internal Revenue Service would find that
the plan met the anti-discrimination tests even though other corporations in the con-
trolled group had a less favorable retirement plan, or no plan at all.
H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 34, at 52-53. The sentence does not require that a plan cover a fair
cross section of both the corporation in question and the controlled group, which is, in essence, the
interpretation necessary in order to argue that the phrase should prevent qualification of corpora-
tion A's Plan I. Rather, the sentence means that if the employees of one corporation are represen-
tative of all the employees in the controlled group and if the plan fairly covers the employees of
the corporation, then the plan can qualify whether or not other members of the group sponsor
plans. If a plan covers a fair cross section of the relevant pool of employees, which under section
414(b) is all the controlled group employees, the plan can qualify. There is no logical relationship
between this statement and the argument that a controlled group plan must qualify by referring to
a fraction of the relevant employee pool, those who happen to be employees of the sponsor.
Moreover, the argument continues the emphasis on the separateness of the members' plans despite
the enactment of section 414(b), which discredits the rationale of that emphasis. See text accom-
panying notes 36-39 supra.
CONTROLLED GROUP
Annual
Compensation
More than $25,000
$20,001 to $25,000
$15,001 to $20,000
$12,501 to $15,000
$10,001 to $I2500
$ 7,501 to $10,000
$ 5,001 to $ 7,500
Plan I
Rich
Corp. A
20
20
20
0
0
0
0
60
Table B
Plan II Plan III
Rich Cross Section
Corp. B Corp.
20 20
20 20
20 20
0 20
0 20
0 20
0 20
60 140
Assume that prior to the enactment of ERISA, Rich Corporation A,
Rich Corporation B, and Cross Section Corporation adopted separate,
comparable pension plans covering all employees in each of the respec-
tive corporations. Assume further that no plan was adopted by Poor
Corporation.
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, the plan of each corporation
qualified separately under the percentage test. After enactment of
ERISA, none of the plans qualify under the percentage test, since em-
ployees of all corporations in the group must be considered. Thus, the
issue in the post-ERISA period is whether the coverage of any of these
plans-singly, or in combination-qualifies as a nondiscriminatory
classification within the meaning of section 410(b)(1)(B). For all three
plans, the answer is unclear.
Certainly a strong argument can be made that Plan III covers a
fair cross section of employees. As Table C below demonstrates, Plan
III covers a distribution of employees (Table C column II) that is a fair
cross section when compared to all employees (Table C column I).
Annual
Compensation
More than $25,000
$20,001 to $25,000
$15,001 to $20,000
$12,501 to $15,000
$10,001 to $12,500
$ 7,501 to $10,000
$ 5,001 to $ 7,500
I
All
Employees
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
Table C
II
Covered by
Plan III
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
III
Excluded
from Plan III
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
IV
Excluded from
All Plans
0
0
0
40
40
40
40
The employees covered by Plan III also seem to qualify as a fair cross
section when compared to the employees not covered by Plan III (Ta-
ble C column III). On the other hand, the Service conceivably might
Plan IV
Poor
Corp.
0
0
0
40
40
40
40
160
Total
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
420
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argue that the relevant comparison is between the employees covered
by Plan III (Table C column II) and the employees excluded from all
plans (Table C column IV). When these two groups are compared, the
plan probably fails to cover a fair cross section, since the compensation
of the excluded employees is not "substantially the same" 60 as the com-
pensation of the covered employees.
The Committee reports squarely address the situation:
[Where the corporation in question contains a fair cross-section of
high- and low-paid employees (compared to the employees of the con-
trolled group as a whole) ... it is anticipated that the Internal Reve-
nue Service would find that the plan met the antidiscrimination tests,
even though other corporations in the controlled group had. . . no
plan at all.61
This statement clearly indicates that, at least with respect to a single
corporate entity in the group, the relevant comparison of the covered
employees is with all employees in the group and not with the employ-
ees excluded from all plans. Thus, although the Service has not yet
concurred with this analysis, if a plan covers the employees of one of
the group's members, and if those employees represent a fair cross sec-
tion of all the group's members, the plan should qualify.
Whether Plan I maintained by Rich Corporation A can qualify is
more problematic. In seeking to establish the qualification of Plan I,
Rich Corporation A would be free to designate Plan I and Plan III (of
Cross Section Corporation) as constituting a single plan (referred to as
"Plan I-III") for purposes of qualifying under section 410(b)(1). 62 The
following Table shows the results of this designation.
Rich Corporation A, in establishing the qualification of designated
Plan I-III, presumably would argue that the relevant comparison is be-
tween employees covered by Plan I-III (Table D column II) and em-
60. Rev. Rul. 70-200, 1970-1 C.B. 101.
61. H.R. RaP. No. 807, supra note 34, at 50 (emphasis added). For a discussion of this sen-
tence, see note 59 supra.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-l(d)(3) (1977). The regulation states that an employer may desig-
nate two or more plans as constituting a single plan. Id. § IAl0(b)-l(d)(3)(i) (1977). By stating
the designation option in permissive rather than mandatory terms, the Service does not require an
employer who wants to designate multiple plans as a single one to do so with reference to all of his
plans. Thus, if an employer had three plans, one of which could qualify by itself and two of which
could qualify only by designation together, the employer could designate the two without includ-
ing the third. Since section 414(b) treats all employees of a controlled group as having one em-
ployer, the separate employers would appear to have similar flexibility in choosing which of the
various members' plans to designate together'in order to qualify.
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Table D 63
I II III IV
Annual All Covered by Excluded from Excluded from
Compensation Employees Plan I-III Plan I-II All Plans
More than $25,000 60 40 20 0
$20,001 to $25,000 60 40 20 0
$15,001 to $20,000 60 40 20 0
$12,501 to $15,000 60 20 40 40
$10,001 to $12,500 60 20 40 40
$ 7,501 to $10,000 60 20 40 40
$ 5,001 to $ 7,500 60 20 40 40
ployees of the entire group (Table D column I). Alternatively, the
corporation might argue that the pertinent comparison is between em-
ployees covered by Plan I-III (Table D column II) and employees of
the group not covered by Plan I-III (Table D column III). Either com-
parison arguably reflects a nondiscriminatory classification within the
meaning of section 410(b)(1) since, under the test articulated in Reve-
nue Ruling 70-200,64 the compensation of the covered employees (col-
umn II) is substantially the same as that of the excluded employees
(column III or column IV) and the plan covers those in the middle and
lower brackets in more than nominal numbers.
As previously indicated, the Service might argue that the relevant
comparison is between the employees covered by Plan I-III (Table D
column II) and those employees not covered by any plan (Table D col-
umn IV). This comparison presumably would result in a failure to
qualify. However, if the comparison is an incorrect one when plans are
not designated for purposes of qualification, then the comparison is an
incorrect one when plans are designated for purposes of qualification.
Finally, suppose that the management of Rich Corporation B also
desires to qualify its Plan II by designating Plan II and Plan III (of
Cross Section Corporation) as a single plan. This designation would
produce coverage data identical to that set forth in Table D with refer-
ence to the Plan I-III designation. Common sense suggests that either
Rich Corporation A or Rich Corporation B, but not both, may desig-
nate Cross Section Corporation's plan. However, the regulations fail to
prohibit multiple use of a designee plan.
As a practical matter, Corporations A and B may have considera-
ble freedom to make these designations. The administrative process by
63. Column II of Table D is the sum of Column I and Column III of Table B.
64. 1970-1 C.B. 101. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
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which the IRS makes advance determinations with respect to the quali-
fied status of employee plans is still primarily oriented to the plans of
single corporate entities rather than to controlled groups of corpora-
tions.6 5 If the plans maintained by the three corporations are separate
plans, a separate application would be submitted for each plan.6 If the
principal offices of the corporations are located in different IRS dis-
tricts, each plan would be submitted to a different IRS office.67 While
the basic forms by which qualified plans are submitted now require
descriptive information concerning the qualified plans maintained by
each corporation in the group, there is no prescribed format that gives
examiners a good overview of the entire group's coverage.6 8 Instead,
the employer who attempts to establish the qualification of his plan is
given a great deal of latitude to present data placing the plan in its most
favorable light.6 9
In summary, the hypothetical controlled group faces much uncer-
tainty. It is possible that none, one, two, or conceivably even all three
of the plans continue to qualify after the enactment of ERISA, and
there is no published authority that even suggests a definitive answer.
3. Effect ofAge and Service Exclusions on Nondiscriminatory Clas-
sffcation Determinations. The preceding discussion was simplified by
the assumption that all of the employees of each of the three corpora-
tions were covered by the respective plan of each corporation. In real-
ity, of course, plans normally have minimum age and service
conditions that would exclude some employees of the corporation
adopting the plan.
Prior to ERISA, the Code permitted an initial eligibility period of
65. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
66. See Dep't of Treasury, IRS Form 5300 (rev. June 1976). See also Dep't of Treasury, IRS
Instructions for Form 5300 (rev. June 1976).
67. Form 5300, supra note 66.
68. See Form 5300, supra note 66, at questions 15, 23(c), 23(e). See also Instructions for
Form 5300, supra note 66, Specific Instruction 15.
69. Of course, such double designation of the Poor Corporation's plan in the hypothetical
above so clearly violates the spirit of section 414(b) that it would be extremely unwise for any
taxpayer to opt for such a course in practice. If a determination letter were obtained from the IRS
on the basis of an incomplete or misleading factual submission, the determination would be of
dubious value. While the Service normally will not revoke a determination letter retroactively,
the Service would clearly not be so bound where the determination letter was issued on the basis
of an incomplete or misleading statement of the taxpayer's facts. See Rev. Proc. 62-31, 1962-2
C.B. 517; ef Rev. Proc. 62-30, 1962-2 C.B. 512 (revocation of tax exemption for entering into a
prohibited transaction). See also Steven Brothers Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 633
(8th Cir. 1963); Cleveland Chiropractic College v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1963);
I.R.C. § 7805(b); S( Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957) (retroac-
tive revocation held to be permissible where exemption was originally based on a mistake of law).
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up to five years and also expressly permitted the exclusion of part-time
employees defined as "employees whose customary employment is for
not more than twenty hours in any one week, and employees whose
customary employment is for not more than five months in any calen-
dar year."7 Under the pre-ERISA Code, age conditions were not per-
mitted as statutory exclusions. ERISA redefined the permitted service
condition as a period of one year of service in which an employee has
1,000 hours of service.7 For the first time, ERISA also provided for a
minimum age condition-not to exceed age twenty-five-as a statutory
exclusion.7" These statutory exclusions are relevant in determining
whether the percentage test has been met.73
In addition, under prior law, the normal administrative practice at
the district level was to exclude all employees in the corporation who
did not meet the service condition of the plan under review in deter-
mining whether a fair cross section existed. The regulations promul-
gated under ERISA now reverse the prior practice. They provide
expressly that in determining whether a nondiscriminatory classifica-
tion exists, employees who do not satisfy the minimum age and service
conditions must be taken into account.74
The impact of the regulations, of course, will vary from situation
to situation. Surprisingly, however, in a large controlled group the
practice of including employees in the measurement pool who are ex-
cluded from coverage by minimum age and service conditions actually
can facilitate demonstration of fair cross section coverage. For exam-
ple, in the case of the hypothetical controlled group described in Table
B, suppose that in each of the corporations ten percent of the employ-
ees in each compensation bracket were not covered by virtue of the
plan's minimum age and service conditions. The following coverage
would result with respect to designated Plan I-III when such persons
are taken into account as required under the regulations.
70. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)(A) (amended 1974).
71. I.R.C. §§ 410(a)(1)(A), 410(a)(3)(A).
72. I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A).
73. I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(A).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-l(b)(2) (1977).
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Annual
Compensation
More than $25,000
$20,001 to $25,000
$15,001 to $20,000
$12,501 to $15,000
$10,001 to $12,500
$ 7,501 to $10,000
$ 5,001 to $ 7,500
All
Employees
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
Table E7
5
II
Covered by
Plan I-III
36
36
36
18
18
18
18
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III
Excluded from
Plan I-III
24
24
24
42
42
42
42
IV
Excluded from
All Plans
6
6
6
42
42
42
42
After taking into account the age and service conditions of the
plans, the coverage is more favorable for qualification than the data in
Table D would reflect.76 Most significantly, the comparison of the cov-
ered employees (Table E column II) with the employees who are ex-
cluded from all plans (Table E column IV) produces results that are at
least, arguably, a fair cross section under the test of Revenue Ruling
70-200. 77
On the other hand, if the universe under comparison excludes all
persons who do not meet the service and age conditions, the following
coverage results.
Table F7 8
Annual
Compensation
More than $25,000
$20,001 to $25,000
$15,001 to $20,000
$12,501 to $15,000
$10,001 to $12,500
$ 7,501 to $10,000
$ 5,001 to $ 7,500
I
All
Employees
54
54
54
54
54
54
54
II III
Covered by Excluded from
Plan I-III Plan I-III
36 18
36 18
36 18
18 36
18 36
18 36
18 36
75. Column 1I of Table E is the sum of Columns I and III of Table B, less i0% in each wage
bracket. For example, in the highest bracket there are 20 employees in Column I of Table B, and
20 employees in Column III for a total of 40 employees. Ten percent, or four employees, do not
meet the age and service requirements, leaving 36 covered employees reflected in Column II of
Table E. Column IV of Table E reflects the number of employees of Rich Corp. A, Rich Corp. B
and Cross Section Corp. not covered by virtue of their failure to satisfy the age and service condi-
tions, plus the employees of Poor Corp. not covered by any plan.
76. See text accompanying note 63-69 supra.
77. 1970-1 C.B. 101.
78. Column I of Table F simply eliminates the 10% of employees not meeting the age and
service conditions. For example, in the highest bracket, there are 60 total employees (see Table B)
of which 10%, or six, do not meet the age and service conditions and are thus eliminated.
IV
Excluded from
All Plans
0
0
0
36
36
36
36
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Table F is less favorable than Table E for meeting the nondiscrimina-
tion requirement because Table F, by eliminating from the comparison
those not satisfying the service and age conditions, increases the ratio of
lower-paid employees to higher-paid employees in the category against
which the coverage is to be measured: those excluded from all of the
controlled group's plans (column IV).
Regulation section 1.410(b)-l(b)(2) undoubtedly is premised on
the belief that, contrary to the above example, the age and service con-
ditions will normally exclude more employees at the lower salary levels
than at the higher levels. While this premise is probably accurate, the
required inclusion of persons not meeting the statutory age and service
requirements is incorrect as a conceptual matter. Age and service ex-
clusions are neutral factors; the mandatory inclusion of persons who
are not covered because they fail to meet the plan's age and service
criteria in the same category with persons who are not covered because
they are members of a job classification for which no plan is main-
tained simply causes confusion. The regulation incorrectly intrudes
into an area that would best have been left to the discretion of the ex-
amining agent.
4. Comparabiithy in the Controlled Group. Under pre-ERISA law,
two or more plans could not be designated as a single plan for purposes
of coverage unless the plan for the lower-paid employees was compara-
ble in contributions or benefits to the plan for the higher-paid employ-
ees.79  Stated differently, if two plans were to be designated as
constituting a single plan for coverage purposes, the employer was re-
quired to demonstrate that the resulting combination of plans satisfied
the general nondiscrimination requirements of section 401(a)(4). In
general, ERISA carried forward the broad requirement of comparabil-
ity with a statutory clarification of a technical question-whether dif-
ferences in vesting affected the comparability of plans."
A general discussion of the standards of comparability is beyond
the scope of this Article. However, comparability should be mentioned
briefly as a postscript to the discussion of coverage because it remains
79. Rev. Rul. 66-15, 1966-1 C.B. 83.
80. In Revenue Ruling 71-503, 1971-2 C.B. 206, the Service took the position that differences
in the vesting schedule of otherwise comparable defined contribution plans prevented the plans
from being considered comparable. In Revenue Ruling 74-165, 1974-1 C.B. 96, the Service re-
treated from that position and held that differences in vesting do not prevent a finding of compa-
rability provided the rates of contribution are comparable. This rule is codified in section
401(a)(5) of the Code as amended by ERISA. In addition, the Service is granted authority to
promulgate regulations pursuant to which differences in rates of vesting would be used as an
actuarial adjustment factor in determining the comparability of benefits. I.R.C. § 401(a)(5).
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an unexamined issue for most controlled groups. In many groups,
there is little uniformity in the plans of the group, especially where the
affiliation occurred after the employee benefit plans had been estab-
lished. Employee benefit plans often have developed on an individual
basis tailored to specific geographic locations and industries. Close
scrutiny of the comparability of plans of controlled employers could
result in plan disqualifications even though plans are maintained by
every member of the group.
Like the law of coverage, the standards of comparability are only
partially developed, and virtually all development was arrested with
the enactment of ERISA. The most sensible approach to enforcement
of the policies underlying section 414(b) is to emphasize elimination of
gaps in plan coverage in the controlled group while permitting greater
flexibility on the question of comparability than was reflected in the
rulings under prior law."1 In any event, the issue of comparability will
remain in the background until there is more substantive elaboration of
the coverage requirements.
V. SINGLE PLAN VERSUS SEPARATE PLANS FOR CONTROLLED
GROUP OF EMPLOYERS
The law prior to the enactment of ERISA made joint adoption of a
single qualified plan by members of a controlled group difficult.82 As a
result, affiliated employers frequently adopted plans with similar, or
even identical, benefit provisions, but maintained the plans as separate
entities. Section 414(b) is widely viewed by experts in the employee
benefit field as erasing these constraints of prior law, and facilitating
the adoption of a single plan (sometimes referred to as a multiple em-
ployer plan 3) by members of a controlled group. However, the use of
section 414(b) to adopt a single plan remains subject to a number of
unanswered questions.
A. Defnition of a Single Plan.
The initial inquiry is, of course, into what factors distinguish a sin-
gle plan maintained by several employers from separate plans main-
8 1. See text accompanying notes 21-32 supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 21-34 supra.
83. A single plan maintained by several affiliated employers is occasionally referred to in the
literature as a "multiple employer plan." See Scharf, Establishing Multiple Employer Plan May Be
Solution to Section 414 Problems of Controlled Employers, 3 J PENSION PLAN & COMPLIANCE 279
(1977). However, the recent proposed regulations under section 413(c) use the term "multiple
employer plan" to refer to plans maintained by more than one corporation except/or plans main-
tained by multiple controlled corporations. See note 39 supra. Accordingly, the term multiple-
employer plan has not been used herein.
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tained by several employers. The most helpful authority on this
question is the recent IRS regulations on transfers of plan assets and
liabilities under ERISA.8 4 These regulations, promulgated for the pur-
pose of indicating when a transfer of plan assets and liabilities occurs
for purposes of section 414(/), include the following definition of a "sin-
gle plan":
A plan is a "single plan" if and only if, on an ongoing basis, all
the plan assets are available to pay benefits to employees who are
covered by the plan .... A plan will not fail to be a single plan
merely because... :
(i) the plan has several distinct benefit structures which apply
either to the same or different participants,
(ii) The plan has several plan documents,
(iii) Several employers, whether or not affiliated, contribute to the
plan, ....
(v) Separate accounting is maintained for purposes of cost alloca-
tion but not for purposes of providing benefits under the
plan.8 5
-On the other hand, the regulations conclude that separate plans exist
when the assets available to satisfy plan liabilities are segregated so that
the assets contributed by one employer may not be used to satisfy the
plan liabilities with respect to the employees of another employer.
The foregoing regulation is illustrated as follows: if a parent cor-
poration and its wholly owned subsidiary each adopt pension plans
providing identical benefits but make contributions to a trust fund es-
tablished pursuant to a trust agreement that specifies that the portion of
the trust fund assets contributed by parent and by subsidiary, respec-
tively, may only be used to pay benefits to each of their respective em-
ployees, then the plans would not be considered a single plan, even
though identical documents are utilized. However, if a corporation and
its subsidiary adopt a plan document that contains different benefit for-
mulas applicable to the employees of the parent and of the subsidiary,
but that provides that all assets contributed to the trust fund would be
available to defray any benefits provided by either plan, then, accord-
ing to the Service, the plan would be considered a "single plan."
B. Consequences of a Single Plan.
The maintenance of a single plan by members of a controlled
group will have a number of tax and practical consequences that the
maintenance by the same employers of separate plans for their respec-
84. Treas. Reg. §§ IA01(a)-12, .414()-1 (1979).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(/)-1(b)(1) (1979).
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tive employees would not have. The most significant consequences are
summarized below.
1. Unjfed Reporting. A single plan will be subject to unified gov-
ernment reporting. Only a single filing, rather than multiple filings,
would be required for the initial qualification application and for the
various periodic filing requirements.86 Where separate plans are main-
tained, the general requirement is that a separate filing must be made
for each separate plan. 7
2. Asset Allocations. If a single plan is maintained, no allocation
of the assets of the single plan will be required to be made with respect
to each of the participating corporate employers, since all plan assets
would be available to pay all plan benefits without regard to the iden-
tity of the corporation employing the participant receiving benefits. In
contrast, if several controlled employers adopt separate plans but com-
mingle assets for investment purposes, there must be a separate ac-
counting for the assets of each plan that credits each plan with
contributions made to it and with its allocable share of trust income,
and that takes account of benefit payments from each plan.88
3. Cost Determinations. It appears that the actuarial cost of a sin-
gle defined benefit plan will be determined for the entire controlled
group and apportioned among the participating corporations, rather
than determined separately for each participating corporation.89 This
approach should make the cost of preparing the annual actuarial evalu-
ation more economical. In addition, where actuarial cost is determined
on an aggregate basis and apportioned among the members of the
group, the cost for individual members may differ from the cost that
would result if cost were calculated separately for each group.
4. Tax Deduction Rules. Except for the qualifications noted be-
low,90 the tax deduction for contributions to the single plan should be
determined on an aggregate basis and apportioned among the members
of the group. In addition, the full funding limitation on deductions
86. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Form EBS-1; Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Form
PBGC-I (rev. July 1978); Dep't of Treasury, IRS, Dep't of Labor, Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration, Form 5500 (1978).
87. See Instructions, Form 5500, supra note 86.
88. See text accompanying notes 105-20 infra.
89. See text accompanying notes 121-23 infra.
90. See text accompanying notes 105-20 infra.
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under section 404 would only be applicable in the event of a full fund-
ing excess for all plans combined.91 In contrast, where the members of
the group maintain separate plans, some members may be limited as to
their deductible amount by the full funding limitation at a time when
other plans within the group are subject to substantial actuarial defi-
ciencies.
5. Plan Terminations. If separate plans are maintained for each
member of the controlled group, the termination of the coverage of one
corporation (for example, by virtue of the sale of a subsidiary) results
in a plan termination with consequent full vesting of all covered em-
ployees, and mandatory proceedings before the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation (PBGC).92 If the plan is underfunded, a potential
deficiency may be assessed by the PBGC against the employer.93 In
contrast, if a single plan is maintained by the controlled group, the ter-
mination of a segment of employees from coverage under the plan (for
example, by virtue of the sale of a subsidiary) may not be considered a
plan termination for PBGC purposes.94
91. Rev. Rul. 64-159, 1964-1 (Part I) C.B. 163. See also I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).
92. ERISA § 4041.
93. ERISA § 4062(b).
94. A considerable body of law governs the termination of a qualified plan. In general, the
law draws a distinction between termination of a qualified plan for federal tax purposes, and
termination of the plan for purposes of the insurance coverage of the PBGC.
Termination of a plan for federal tax purposes raises potential issues pertaining to the plan's
qualification. A requirement of tax qualification under section 401 is that a plan be a program
sponsored by an employer with the intention that it will be permanent. Treas. Reg. § IA0-1(b)(2)
(1977). An early abandonment of the plan without valid business reason may indicate that the
plan was never intended as a permanent plan, and may therefore cause retroactive disqualification
of the plan. Rev. Rul. 69-24, 1969-1 C.B. 110. In addition, if at the time of discontinuance, bene-
fits available for rank-and-file employees are not comparable to the benefits available for highly
paid personnel, the IRS may contend that the plan was not maintained for the exclusive benefit of
employees. See Rev. Rul. 69-25, 1969-1 C.B. 113. Finally, the Code requires that a participant's
rights to benefits accrued in a qualified plan must become completely nonforfeitable upon "termi-
nation" or "partial termination" of the plan to the extent that the assets held under the plan are
sufficient to provide benefits. See I.R.C. § 41 l(d)(3)(A).
The issue of whether a plan has wholly or partially terminated for tax purposes is one of fact.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(b) (1977). There is normally no factual question when a plan is com-
pletely terminated, but difficult questions occur in the "partial termination" context. Where a
group of employees sever employment, the question arises whether this simply constitutes multi-
ple regular terminations under the plan (subject to the regular vesting rules) or whether, on the
other hand, a partial termination of the plan has occurred. The regulations merely provide that
this determination will be made based on all the facts and circumstances. Two pre-ERISA rulings
illustrate such factual determinations: Revenue Ruling 72-510, 1972-2 C.B. 223 and Revenue Rul-
ing 73-284, 1973-2 C.B. 139. The thrust of these rulings is that the discontinuance of any signifi-
cant discrete business segment results in a partial termination for tax purposes.
From the viewpoint of the PBGC, the termination or partial termination of a plan raises
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6. Transfer of Employees Between Corporations. Where separate
plans are maintained by each member of the group, the transfer of em-
ployees between corporations may result in complex consequences. If
the group members desire to transfer assets corresponding to the actua-
rial liability assumed in connection with the employee transfer from
one plan to another, then the employer must comply with the elaborate
rules governing transfers of plan assets and liabilities." These difficul-
ties are eliminated where a single plan covers both corporate entities
since there is no transfer of assets or liabilities as a result of an em-
ployee transfer.
C. Merger of Separate Plans into a Single Plan.
The advantages of a single plan over a separate plan for a con-
trolled group of corporations understandably promote a desire to con-
vert the members' various plans into a single one. Frequently, the
plans have similar benefit structures, and the assets already are held in
a single commingled investment trust.
The merger of controlled group plans is governed by section 414()
of the Code.96 The purpose of this provision is to insure that a merger
different issues. The critical question is whether an event has occurred that triggers the plan ter-
mination insurance provisions of ERISA. See ERISA §§ 4001-4068.
In general, ERISA provides for insurance to plan participants when assets are insufficient to
pay basic benefits under a plan that has been "terminated" either by the plan administrator
(ERISA § 4041) or by the PBGC (ERISA § 4042). The statutory scheme leaves many unanswered
questions about what constitutes termination. The application of the PBGC definition of termina-
tion leaves considerable uncertainty in the context of a partial termination in which some of the
employees covered by a plan cease employment by virtue of the sale of a division or subsidiary.
Section 4043(b)(4) of ERISA expressly states that a partial termination for tax purposes does not
by itself constitute or require a termination for PBGC insurance purposes. Some evidence in the
legislative history of section 4043 supports the proposition that the insurance provisions are trig-
gered in the event of partial termination. See materials cited in Gilcrist, (ERISA)-Plan Termina-
tions. Corporate Acquisitions, 312 TAX MANAGEMENT A-38 (1976). Nonetheless, the PBGC itself
has taken the position that many partial terminations are not covered except as expressly provided
by ERISA. See Letter of PBGC in connection with Anthracite Health and Welfare Fund, Case
No. 140-1, PENS. REP. (BNA) (Aug. 21, 1975) and PENS. REP. (BNA) R-2 (Aug. 25, 1975).
The evolving standard of the PBGC seems to focus on the reportable event requirement of
ERISA § 4043(b)(3). According to that section, a reportable event occurs when "the number of
active participants is less than 80% of the number of such participants at the beginning of the plan
year." Id. In the case of a closing or disposition of a segment of the business covering participants
in a plan comprising less than 20% of the total participants in a larger plan, the PBGC will not
necessarily take the position that a termination for PBGC purposes has occured even if there is
partial termination for tax purposes.
95. See ERISA § 208;.I.R.C. §§ 212(1), 401(a)(12); Treas. Reg. § 1.414(1)-(b)(3) (1979).
96. I.R.C. § 414(l) provides:
Mergers and Consolidations of Plans or Transfers of Plan Asses.-A trust which
forms a part of a plan shall not constitute a qualified trust under section 401 and a plan
shall be treated as not described in sections 403(a) or 405 unless in the case of any merger
or consolidation of the plan with, or in the case of any transfer of assets or liabilities of
such plan to, any other trust plan after September 2, 1974, each participant in the plan
would (if the plan then terminated) receive a benefit immediately after the merger, con-
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of plans or a transfer of plan assets and liabilities does not result in
diminished benefit security, as measured on a plan termination basis,
for any participant. Under regulations promulgated pursuant to sec-
tion 414(1), the term "merger" is defined as any combination of two or
more plans into a single plan.97
The section 414(/) regulations provide that no merger of separate
plans will be permitted unless one of two conditions is met. First, a
merger of separate plans will be considered to satisfy section 414(,) if
the merged plan is "fully funded"; that is, if the sum of the assets of all
the plans to be merged is not less than the sum of the present value of
the accrued benefits of all plans using reasonable actuarial assump-
tions.98 If the merged plan is not fully funded, a "special schedule of
benefits" procedure must be followed.9 9 The special schedule proce-
dure calls for alteration of the plan's allocation of assets on a future
plan termination basis so that participants of the better-funded plan do
not lose benefit security as a result of the merger. The calculation of a
special schedule of benefits need not be made if an enrolled actuary
certifies that the necessary data will be maintained for five years in or-
der to make such a determination as of the date of merger.100
The regulations governing the division of plans include a grandfa-
ther clause that permits defined benefit plans maintained for different
groups of employees under which separate accounting of assets has
been maintained to spin off (or divide) into separate plans on or before
July 1, 1978, if the liabilities and assets of each group of employees
were allocated to the group in the division.' No similar grandfather
clause is proposed for a merger of plans. Accordingly, plans of con-
trolled employers may be combined only in situations in which both
plans are fully funded, unless the employer is willing to undergo the
expense of the special schedule procedure. 0 2
solidation, or transfer which is equal to or greater than the benefit he would have been
entitled to receive immediately before the merger, consolidation, or transfer (if the plan
had then terminated). This paragraph shall apply in the case of a multiemployer plan
only to the extent determined by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(1-I(b)(2) (1979).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.414()-1(e)(1) (1979).
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(/)-1(e)(2) (1979).
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(I)-1(i)(1) (1979).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(1)-(n)(3) (1979).
102. Occasionally, it is unclear whether members of the controlled group maintain a single
plan or separate plans. Where plan assets are held in a single commingled trust, the trust agree-
ments may be ambiguous on the question of whether the assets of one plan could be used to satisfy
the liabilities of another plan. In such cases the plan sponsor presumably should adopt amenda-
tory language clarifying the situation. Depending upon the facts, there may be room for the spon-
sor to take the position that the plan was always a single plan and thus was not subject to the plan
merger requirements.
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D. Uncertainties Associated with Maintenance of Single Plans in the
Controlled Group.
Since the advantages of a single plan versus several separate plans
outweigh the disadvantages in some cases, controlled employers are ex-
perimenting with the adoption of single plans and, where possible
under the plan merger rules, with the combination of previously sepa-
rate plans into a single plan. However, assuming a single plan can be
adopted for a particular controlled group of corporations, the steps nec-
essary to remain in compliance with ERISA are unclear.
Section 414(b) itself provides that the Service may prescribe regu-
lations governing the application of the minimum funding standards
and the apportionment of applicable limitations under section 404(a)
among corporations when a single plan is adopted by more than one
member of a controlled group. Otherwise, section 414 contains no limi-
tation on the flexibility of affiliated employers in establishing a single
plan for the benefit of their respective employees. The Service has
failed thus far to promulgate rules pursuant to its rulemaking power
under these sections; indeed, the Service has permitted the relevant pre-
ERISA rules to remain on the books despite the philosophical inconsis-
tencies between section 414(b) and those rules.'0 3 The next section will
examine the tax consequences'0 4 of the allocation of contributions of
costs and forfeitures for the single controlled-group plan under section
414(b)-as contrasted With their tax consequences under the pre-ER-
ISA "separateness" rules.
1. Profit Sharing Plans. Allocation of Contributions and Forfeit-
ures. In Revenue Ruling 69-35,"5 the IRS considered a profit sharing
plan adopted by a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary.
The plan provided that contributions to the plan from each corporation
would be aggregated and allocated among the accounts of the individ-
ual participants in the same proportion that each participant's compen-
sation bore to the total compensation of all participating employees of
both corporations. Thus, it was possible that an amount contributed by
one corporation might be allocated to employees of another corpora-
tion. The Service ruled that the allocation provision did not jeopardize
103. See text accompanying notes 21-30 supra.
104. In extreme situations the maintenance of a "single" plan by multiple employers also
could have tax consequences among the employers outside the context of Subchapter D. For
example, absent further published authority, practitioners cannot assume that section 482 and the
case law pertaining to constructive dividends between brother-sister corporations do not have at
least a peripheral applicability. See authorities cited in note 32 supra. See also I.R.C. § 482; Rev.
Rul. 78-83, 1978-1 C.B. 79; Rev. Rul. 69-630, 1969-2 C.B. 122.
105. 1969-1 C.B. 117.
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the qualified status of the plans, but that amounts contributed by one
corporation were not deductible to the extent that they were allocated
to employees of the other corporation-1 "6 Similarly, the Service in Rev-
enue Ruling 69-57017 ruled that a profit sharing plan that permitted
forfeitures to be reallocated among all employees in the controlled
group would not qualify.
In determining the continued vitality of these rules following the
enactment of section 414(b), one must initially distinguish between a
profit sharing plan maintained by a parent-subsidiary controlled group
that has elected to file a consolidated income tax return and a profit
sharing plan maintained by a brother-sister controlled group or other
controlled group that is not filing a consolidated return. 0 8 In the case
of a controlled group filing a consolidated return, both revenue rulings
should be revoked in their entirety. In Revenue Ruling 69-35,109 the
Service concluded that contributions made by one corporation were not
deductible if allocated to another corporation in the controlled group
since the parent was not "the employer of those benefiting from the
contribution" within the meaning of section 404 of the Code, which
grants a deduction only for contributions by an "employer. .. on ac-
count of any employee.""110 Section 414(b) expressly provides that for
purposes of section 401, all employees employed by any member of the
controlled group shall be considered as employed by a single employer.
The first sentence of section 414(b), however, does not refer to section
404. Nonetheless, a proper construction of section 404 is that amounts
are deductible under section 404 for any contributions on behalf of per-
sons who are considered employees for purposes of section 401."
106. Id.
107. 1969-1 C.B. 91.
108. The Code itself distinguishes between parent-subsidiary groups and brother-sister groups
with respect to make-up contributions under I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(B). See note 28 supra.
109. 1969-1 C.B. 117.
110. I.R.C. § 404(a).
111. Section 404 by its terms does not impose any literal requirement that a deduction is
granted under section 404 only in respect of contributions for an employer's own employees. Sec-
tion 404(a) simply permits deductions for
contributions. . . paid by an employer to or under a stock bonus, pension, profit-shar-
ing, or annuity plan... :
(1) .
(A) . . . In the taxable year when paid, if the contributions are paid into a
pension trust, and if such taxable year ends within or with a taxable year of the trust
for which the trust is exempt under Section 501(a). . ..
The rationale of Revenue Ruling 69-35, 1969-1 C.B. 117, for disallowing an employer's con-
tribution otherwise deductible under section 404 when the contributions are allocated to the em-
ployees of another employer is not fully articulated, but it is not based on any literal requirement
of section 404.
Section 414(b) specifically provides that for purposes of section 401 the employees of each
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When this construction is given to section 404, section 414(b) provides
statutory authority for permitting a member of the controlled group to
deduct contributions on behalf of another member of the group.'12
Assuming that the literal language of sections 401, 404 and 414
would permit a deduction when one corporation makes a contribution
to a profit sharing plan on account of an employee of an affiliated em-
ployer, the question remains whether the Service would have underly-
ing policy objections to permitting the deduction. If the controlled
group files a consolidated return, there is no substantial policy objec-
tion to permitting the deduction. Under the consolidated return rules,
the entire group normally would compute its consolidated income tax
liability after taking into account deductions for profit sharing contri-
butions by every corporation in the group. Of course, some special
rules in the consolidated return regulations, such as the rules pertaining
to separate return limitation years," I3 arguably might be subverted by
permitting one corporation to obtain a deduction for payments on be-
half of another corporation's employees. On the other hand, the under-
lying policy reason for section 414(b) is furthered when a plan permits
proportionate allocation throughout the controlled group of contribu-
tions by any member of the group. These policy considerations sub-
stantially outweigh any concerns about distortions in income within the
group.' "4 Thus, Revenue Ruling 69-35 should be revoked at least to
the extent that it applies to controlled employers who file a consoli-
employer in the control group shall be considered as employed by a single employer. Section 404
literally provides that amounts are deductible for contributions to plans that are exempt under
section 501 as a result of their qualification under section 401. Clearly, in order to maintain quali-
fication under section 401, as modified by section 414(b), plans will frequently be required to
cover employees of more than one entity in the controlled group. A reasonable interpretation of
the statutory scheme as a whole is that no impediment exists under section 404 to the deduction of
amounts allocated to employees of other employers in the controlled group.
112. Contributions for employees of non-affiated corporations covered under a joint plan ap-
pear clearly deductible under I.R.C. §§ 413(b), (c)(2). Analogously, the contibutions for employ-
ees of affiliated corporations should be deductible and the Service's position that section 413(c) is
not applicable to controlled employers is doubtful. See note 39 supra.
1 13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(c)(1) (1979).
114. The author believes that section 414(b) expresses a fundamental policy judgment to en-
courage expansion of plan benefits throughout the controlled group without regard to the artificial
distinctions between corporate entities. Different persons of reasonable judgment might reach
different policy conclusions under the facts. It would be possible to argue, for example, that the
underlying policy of section 414(b) is not to encourage broader coverage within controlled groups,
but merely to define circumstances in which plans ofentities within the group will not be accorded
qualified status. In other words, section 414(b) could be viewed merely as a negative sanction. If
one accepts the affirmative view of section 414(b), its policies will almost inherently conflict with
policies of accurate reflection of income, In the balancing of these policy concerns, this author
weighs the broader participation by all employees in the group in the plan as being the overriding
policy concern.
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dated return.
When the employers that jointly sponsor the profit sharing plan
are brother-sister corporations, the objections of the Service to revoca-
tion of Revenue Ruling 69-35 could well be stronger. The Service
could argue that permitting contribution by one corporation of
amounts allocated to the account of employees of a sister corporation
has serious intercorporate economic consequences in which the Service
has a substantial interest. As noted earlier, t"5 analogous principles of
tax law would support an argument that such a payment is subject to
reallocation under section 482 and amounts to a constructive dividend
to the common shareholders of the corporation making the payment,
followed by a correlative contribution to the capital of the other corpo-
ration and payment by the other corporation to the profit sharing
plan. 16 The Service might argue that an amount contributed to a
profit sharing plan for allocation to employees of a sister corporation is
deductible, if at all, only by the sister corporation, and then only if
there is evidence of dividend treatment to the common shareholders
(who might also be employees covered by the plan and receiving an
allocation). Accordingly, the regulations under section 414(b) may ulti-
mately require that profit sharing contributions to joint plans main-
tained by brother-sister corporations be allocated solely among the
employees of the corporation that makes the contribution.
The potential concerns of the Service are more attentuated with
reference to the issue of allocation of forfeitures addressed in Revenue
Ruling 69-570.1 17 Section 414(b) repudiates by necessary implication
the technical "exclusive benefit" rationale of Revenue Ruling 69-
570.1t8 The reallocation of forfeitures among all employees within the
115. See note 104 supra and authorities cited in note 32 supra.
116. In general, it is the position of the Service that transfers between related corporations
without adequate consideration are subject to constructive dividend treatment "whether or not the
motive for the transfer was an attempt improperly to allocate income or deductions between the
corporations." Rev. Rul. 78-83, 1978-1 C.B. 80. However, some cases have rejected dividend
treatment when there was no evidence of shareholder benefit. W.B. Rushing, 51 T.C. 888 (1969):
Columbian Rope Co., 42 T.C. 800 (1964). Presumably, there would be shareholder benefit where
the shareholder is also an employee-participant.
117. 1969-2 C.B. 91.
118. 1969-2 C.B. 91. The exclusive benefit rationale of Revenue Ruling 69-570 is premised on
the fact that the term "employer" is used in the singular in section 401(a)(2). Accordingly, in
Revenue Ruling 69-570, the Service held that the diversion of plan assets contributed by an em-
ployer to benefit another employer's employees is a violation of section 401(a)(2). Yet section
414(b) provides that for purposes of section 401, all employees of all corporations that are mem-
bers of a controlled group of corporations shall be treated as employed by a single employer. If
the employees of another corporate member of the control group are treated as being employed by
the employer that contributes to the plan, the diversion of plan assets for the benefit of such other
employees could no longer be viewed as violating this narrow exclusive benefit interpretation. See
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controlled group presents a much more remote intercorporate eco-
nomic consequence than the direct allocation of the employer contribu-
tion. The termination of an employee is frequently beyond the
employer's control, or, in the case of discharge, unlikely to be moti-
vated by the intercorporate economic effect of the forfeiture realloca-
tion. When a parent-subsidiary controlled group files a consolidated
return there seems to be no legitimate policy objection to the allocation
of forfeitures among all employees of all the members of the group.
Similarly, in the brother-sister context, the sharing of an employee in
an amount forfeited under a qualified plan seems too indirect a benefit
to result in a section 482 allocation or in an argument of dividend treat-
ment to common shareholders of the brother-sister corporation.' 19 On
the other hand, the policies of section 414(b) are served by such an
allocation. 2 ' Accordingly, there is no legitimate policy reason why
Revenue Ruling 69-570 should not be revoked in its entirety.
2. Defined Benefit Plans. Uncertainties in Allocation of Cost. In
Revenue Ruling 69-525,t21 the Service ruled that in the case of a de-
fined benefit pension plan adopted jointly by affiliated employers, each
employer's contributions to the plan and deduction under section 404
must be determined by the separate computation of actuarial cost with
respect to each adopting employer, unless the separate computation of
costs is not "feasible."' 22 The only example given of a circumstance in
which separate computation of costs is not feasible is a plan adopted by
two companies that "continually shift" employees between the two
companies. In that situation, the ruling concludes that the companies
the text accompanying note 31 supra and the argument set forth in note 39 supra that section
413(c)(2) also revokes the exclusive benefit requirement.
119. A forfeiture only occurs under a qualified plan upon the termination of an employee
prior to the requisite vesting period stated in the plan. Frequently, of course, such forfeitures are
beyond the control of the employer since they result from the employee's volitional act of termi-
nating employment. Even where the employee is discharged, loss of the employee's services in
most cases is an event of much greater economic and business significance to the employer than
the fact of a forfeiture under the plan. Moreover, the allocation of the forfeiture normally is
unpredictable at the time the forfeiture occurs, since such an allocation depends upon the future
status of other employees in the plan during the remainder of the year. For all of the foregoing
reasons, the reallocation of a forfeiture pursuant to the terms of a preexisting plan normally could
not be viewed as an event providing an adequate basis for a section 482 allocation. As contrasted
to, for example, a less than fair market value sale of goods or a below market rate of interest loan,
the intercorporate economic consequences of the forfeiture reallocation seem too remote.
120. If one views the policy of section 414(b) as encouraging the placing of employees of the
controlled group on equal footing in their participation in qualified plan benefits, then that policy
is best served when the forfeitures are allocated evenly among the employees of the group. See
text accompanying note 37 supra.
121. 1969-2 C.B. 102.
122. Id.
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could determine cost on an aggregate basis and apportion cost between
the two companies in proportion to their respective participating pay-
rolls.
The last sentence of section 414(b) provides that "[w]ith respect to
a plan adopted by more than one such [controlled] corporation. . . the
applicable limitations provided by section 404(a) shall be determined
as if all such employers were a single employer, and allocated to each
employer in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary."' 2 3 It seems clear from the literal language of section 414(b) that
the applicable limits of section 404(a)(1) and related limits, such as the
full funding limit, will be computed on an aggregate basis. However,
whether the basic rule of Revenue Ruling 69-525, which requires sepa-
rate actuarial cost determination (from which the section 404(a)(1) lim-
its derive), will carry over in regulations to be adopted is unclear.
The legitimate concerns of the Service in this area are similar to
those concerning profit sharing plans.'24 The accurate allocation of
costs is essential to the determination of the respective tax liabilities of
the affiliated employers; moreover, at least in the case of brother-sister
corporations, the misallocation of costs could be viewed as a substantial
transfer of benefit from one corporation to the other.
One can imagine fact situations in which proper apportionment of
cost would be a matter of concern. Consider the brother-sister con-
trolled group consisting of Corporations A and B. Suppose that Corpo-
rations A and B adopt a defined benefit plan granting full past service
credit. Suppose further that Corporation A has a participating payroll
of $100,000 consisting of ten employees each age twenty-five with one
year of service earning $10,000 per annum. Corporation B's participat-
ing payroll also is $100,000, but consists of one employee age sixty-four
with forty years service earning $100,000 per annum, who also happens
to be the principal shareholder of both corporations. Any actuarial
method that does not precisely reflect the cost for Corporation B would
have serious intercorporate reallocation potential, not to mention the
question of proper apportionment of the section 404(a)(1)(A)(ii)
limit. 125
123. I.R.C. § 414(b).
124. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
125. The foregoing example illustrates most vividly the type of situation in which abuse poten-
tial is present. Of course, an actuarial determination of plan cost for the aggregated AB plan
would reflect the high actuarial cost of the employee of corporation B, whose large benefit must be
funded over the one remaining year of service prior to his normal retirement age. On the other
hand, the ten lower-paid employees would have a drastically smaller actuarial cost because their
benefits would be funded over the forty years remaining to their normal retirement dates. The
issue is the manner in which the aggregate cost of the entire plan is apportioned among the sepa-
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On the other hand, the determination of cost is not an exact sci-
ence; determinations will vary depending upon the actuarial method
selected. Within the confines of a single corporate entity, the Service
has historically permitted use of various "aggregate" methods of cost
determination, which can be viewed as being less exact than "individ-
ual" methods wherein an actuarial cost for each individual employee is
computed.
As a practical matter, the criticism of Revenue Ruling 69-525 is
that it has been interpreted to always require a separate computation of
cost for each corporate entity if it is possible to make such a computa-
tibn-without regard to whether a separate computation is required to
apportion cost accurately. For a controlled group with numerous cor-
porate entities, it is necessary for the actuary to compute a cost for each
entity separately. The option of making one cost computation using an
aggregate method that is reasonable under the circumstances and ap-
portioning cost between entities has not been available in theory. It is
hoped that regulations under section 414(b) will, therefore, appropri-
ately modify the rule of Revenue Ruling 69-525.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the problems raised by section 414(b) call for prompt
attention by the Internal Revenue Service. In the area of coverage and
discrimination, the Service must begin the difficult task of delineating
the standards that it will apply in implementing the policy of section
414(b) in the controlled group context. This would most effectively be
accomplished by the publication of revenue rulings similar to Revenue
Ruling 70-200 126 that set forth the standards to be applied. Of critical
importance is a clear definition of the relevant included and excluded
groups for comparison purposes in establishing a nondiscriminatory
classification.
In addition, the Service needs to move promptly to promulgate
rate entities. Clearly, a simplistic method such as apportioning cost in proportion to the partici-
pating payrolls would result in a distortion of cost. While atypical, the illustration simply is
designed to demonstrate the complexity of this type of problem.
Section 404(a)(l)(A)(ii) of the Code establishes one of the three alternative limits on the max-
imum tax deductible contribution to a pension plan. That Code section provides that the maxi-
mum deductible contribution to a pension plan is an amount necessary to amortize the remaining
unfunded cost of past and current service credits as a level amount over the remaining future
service of each employee. The section establishes a special limit stating that if the remaining
unfunded cost with respect to any three individuals is more than 50% of the remaining unfunded
cost of the entire plan, the amount of the unfunded cost attributable to such individuals may not
be deducted any faster than over a five-year period.
126. 1970-1 C.B. 101.
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regulations under section 414(b) governing the allocation of cost within
the controlled group. As an intermediate step, the Service should an-
nounce the revocation of Revenue Rulings 69-35, 69-525 and 69-570.
The plans of controlled groups of employers are among the most
important in the private sector since they typically include the plans of
the very largest employers. Controlled employers are entitled to rea-
sonable answers to the questions raised by ERISA. Such answers
should give fair weight to the policy of section 414(b), but also should
give weight to the need of employers to have practical and clearly de-
fined rules that permit them to go about the business of providing re-
tirement benefits to their employees.

